Abstract. We consider a generalisation of the hidden number problem recently introduced by Boneh and Venkatesan. The initial problem can be stated as follows: recover a number a ∈ Fp such that for many known random t ∈ Fp approximations to the values of at p are known. Here we study a version of the problem where the "multipliers" t are not known but rather certain approximations to them are given. We present a probabilistic polynomial time solution when the error is small enough, and we show that the problem cannot be solved if the error is sufficiently large. We apply the result to the bit security of "timed-release crypto" introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Wagner, to noisy exponentiation black-boxes and to the bit security of the "inverse" exponentiation. We also show that it implies a certain bit security result for Weil pairing on elliptic curves.
Introduction
For an integer m ≥ 2 we denote by Z m the residue ring modulo m, which we identify with the set of integers k ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1}; Z * m is the subset of Z m consisting of the integers k ∈ Z m with gcd(k, m) = 1. In particular, for a prime p we denote by F p the field of p elements. For integers s and m ≥ 1 we denote by s m the remainder of s on division by m, and we write r m = min{ r m , m − r m }.
We also use log z to denote the binary logarithm of z > 0.
In this paper, we study a variant of the hidden number problem introduced in 1996 by Boneh and Venkatesan [4, 5] . The original problem can be stated as follows: recover a number a ∈ F p such that for many known random t ∈ F p approximations to the values of at p are known.
It turned out that for many applications, including some results about the bit security of Diffie-Hellman, Shamir and several other cryptosystems [8, 9, 28] and for results on attacking the DSA and DSA-like signature schemes (both heuristically [10, 19] and rigorously [6, 20, 21] ), the condition that t is selected uniformly at random from F p is too restrictive. It has been systematically exploited in the aforementioned papers [6, 8, 9, 20, 21, 28] that the method of [4, 5] can be adjusted 1474 N. A. HOWGRAVE-GRAHAM, P. Q. NGUYEN, AND I. E. SHPARLINSKI to the case when t is selected from a sequence which has some uniformity of distribution property. Thus bounds of exponential sums of various kinds have been used in these papers, as exponential sums are a natural tool to establish uniformity results. Similar results about recovering polynomials f ∈ F p [X] from approximations to the values of f (t) p are known as well [27] . However, in all the above works the values of t are assumed to be known exactly.
Here we consider the situation where this is no longer the case. Namely, we consider the following problem: recover a number a ∈ F p such that for many random t ∈ F p approximations to the values of both at p and t are known. In fact we consider this problem modulo an arbitrary integer m.
We design a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm for this problem when the absolute error of approximation is O(m 1/5−ε ). We apply this result to study the bit security of "timed-release crypto" introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Wagner [24] . We also use it to design a "correction" algorithm for noisy exponentiation blackboxes. This result is similar to those known for algebraic functions over finite fields [13] . Finally, we study the bit security of the "inverse" exponentiation which has recently appeared in several cryptographic scenarios, see [17, 25] .
On the other hand, we also show that even modulo a prime p the problem cannot be solved in polynomial time if the absolute error of approximation is p 1/2+ε using uniformity of distribution results. This contrasts quite dramatically to the situation with the original hidden number problem, where the multipliers are known, in which case one can recover a from crude approximations to at p of order
see [4] . In fact, it is possible even for larger values of ∆ with a nonuniform algorithm, see [5] .
Hereafter the implied constants in symbols 'O' may occasionally, where obvious, depend on the small positive parameters ε and are absolute otherwise; they are all effective and can be explicitly evaluated.
Lattices
As in [4, 5] , our results rely on rounding techniques in lattices. We therefore review a few related results and definitions.
Let {b 1 , . . . , b s } be a set of linearly independent vectors in R s . The set of vectors
Such a basis is not unique. A basic lattice problem is the closest vector problem (CVP), also called the nearest lattice point problem: given a lattice basis and a vector u ∈ R n , find a lattice vector minimizing the distance to u. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that can approximate the closest vector problem up to some subexponential factor (see for instance [18 
Proof. The statement is a combination of the Schnorr modification [26] of the lattice basis reduction algorithm of Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász [16] with a result of Kannan [12] about reduction of the closest vector problem to the shortest vector problem.
In fact, for our applications we apply it in a better-known form with the constant 2 s (as found by Babai [2] ), namely
Moreover, because in our applications the dimension s is fixed, we can also use algorithms which find the closest vector in a lattice in polynomial time (see [11, 1] ).
The following result can be interpreted as a statement about short vectors in a certain two-dimensional lattice, and thus has some links with Lemma 1. However, as usual with two-dimensional lattices, continued fractions provide stronger statements and shorter proofs. Proof. Let P i and Q i denote respectively the numerator and denominator of the ith continued fraction convergents to A/m, i ≥ 1. There exists j such that
. We define ∆ = m Assume that the smallest prime divisor p of m satisfies the inequality
There exists a deterministic polynomial time algorithm A such that for any a ∈ Z * Proof. Using Lemma 2, we find a nonzero integer λ with
We define
, and a − A = α. We have
We denote by L the d + 1-dimensional lattice generated by the rows of the
Then we see that this lattice contains a vector
where U d+1 = 0. To find v and thus to recover a we use the algorithm of Lemma 1, getting a lattice vector w = (w 1 , . . . , w d , w d+1 ) with
We show that with probability 1
From (1) and (2) we derive
Therefore for every i = 1, . . . , d the inequality
For each c ∈ Z m with gcd(c, m) = f and every integer h ∈ [0, m/2) there are at most
Because of the conditions of the theorem we have 0
Hence the inequality
holds for at most
Hence the probability that (3) holds for every i = 1, . . . , d when t 1 , . . . , t d are chosen uniformly and independently at random from Z * m is at most 33d
provided that m is large enough. Thus the probability that this happens for at least one b ∈ Z m is at most
and the result follows.
Recalling that the smallest prime divisor p of m satisfies the inequality
we see that m has at most two prime divisors. Therefore
Hence for T = Z * m one can apply Theorem 1 with ρ = 1 and thus with ∆ = m 1/5−ε . It is easy to see that Theorem 1 applies to prime values of m = p as well as to RSA moduli m = pl which are products of two primes p < l < 2p.
Applications
Here we show how to apply Theorem 1 to the bit security of "timed-release crypto" introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Wagner in [24] , and to noisy exponentiation black-boxes.
We recall that the construction of [24] relies on the assumed hardness of computing the function ϑ 
in O(log s) modular multiplications and then by computing
Otherwise it is assumed that any algorithm to compute this value takes at least s consecutive exponentiations (even if unlimited parallelism is allowed). We show that Theorem 1 implies a certain result about the bit security of this function. We remark that in [24] this scheme is considered with e = 2. Here we consider a slightly different case of gcd(e, ϕ(m)) = 1. If the largest power of 2-adic order of the Carmichael function λ(m), is not too large (which is true for the overwhelming majority of the moduli), then the case e = 2 can be considered as well.
Let RSW ∆ denote an oracle which, given any v ∈ Z * m , outputs some V such that v Let g ∈ F p be a fixed element of multiplicative order τ , which is the smallest positive integer k for which
Let EX P ∆ denote an oracle which, given any v ∈ [0, τ − 1], outputs V such that Of course the result of Theorem 3 makes sense only if g is unknown. In fact, applying Theorem 3 with s = 1, one can simply recover g p first and then use repeated squaring to compute g s p for any s. Theorem 3 is also related to the reconstruction of linear congruential generators of pseudorandom numbers, see [7, 15] , but has a different flavour and seems to be independent of these results.
We now assume that the multiplicative order τ of g ∈ F p is prime, and for v ∈ [1, τ − 1] we denote by v the multiplicative inverse of v modulo τ , that is, vv ≡ 1 (mod τ ).
Let IDH ∆ denote an oracle which, given g 
chosen uniformly at random, and we apply the algorithm of Theorem 1 to derive the result.
It would be interesting to obtain the same result for arbitrary multiplicative orders τ without the restriction that it must be prime, in particular for τ = p − 1 (that is, for primitive roots g). On the other hand, typically in cryptographic applications elements of prime multiplicative order are of special interest. It can also be relevant to recall that we know from [3] that for infinitely many primes p, p − 1 has a prime divisor τ ≥ p 0.677 (thus it overlaps with the region where Theorem 4 applies).
Lower bound
Here we show that Theorem 1 cannot be substantially improved. Namely, if ∆ = m 1/2+ε , then for every a ∈ Z * m there are exponentially many integers b ∈ Z * m which cannot be distinguished from a based only on the inequalities of Theorem 1. This lower bound is based on a result about the uniformity of distribution of the pairs (τ, bτ m ), τ ∈ Z m . For simplicity we obtain our lower bound for m = p prime, but the result can easily be extended to arbitrary moduli. 
Proof. Let e p (z) = exp(2πiz/p). We recall the identity (see Exercise 11.a in Chapter 3 of [30] ) p such that τ ≡ s (mod p) for some s ∈ I and as p ≡ r (mod p) for some r ∈ J . We also put
where the maximum is taken over all intervals I and J , and µ(I) and µ(J ) are the lengths of I and J , respectively. Using (4), we obtain
Separating the term µ(I)µ(J )/p corresponding to c = 0 and using (5), we obtain
Hence,
Then from the previous inequality we conclude that #Bp
We denote the set of such elements by F a,A . Let T, S ∈ [0, p − 1]. We consider the intervals
and
Remarking that #A ≥ 4∆ − 3, we obtain the desired result. 
Proof. We use the definition of D b from the proof of Theorem 5. Let B be the set of b ∈ F * p for which D b > p 1/3+ε . As in the proof of Theorem 5, we conclude that 
and the desired result follows. 
Generalizations and open questions
It would be very important to extend Theorem 1 to the case when the multipliers t i are selected from a sufficiently large subgroup G of Z * m . In particular, this would imply an analogue of Theorem 2 with e = 2 corresponding to the choice of e suggested in [24] . Also, one would be able to obtain an analogue of Theorem 3 modulo a composite and when g is not necessarily a primitive root but rather generates a subgroup of Z * m of sufficiently large order. It is easy to see that, using the exponential sums technique in the same style as it is done in [6, 8, 9, 20, 21] , one can obtain an analogue of Theorem 1 in the case when the multipliers t i are selected from a subgroup G of Z * m . Using the bounds of exponential sums from [14] , and some other previously known bounds, such results can be established for subgroups of size
Certainly increasing the admissible values of ∆ from m 1/5−ε to a large value would be a very interesting result. For example, it would be very interesting to show that a certain portion k = o(log m) of the most significant bits of ϑ e s m are as secure as the whole value. Here we describe another possible approach which can possibly lead to better bounds.
Assume we are given four integers T i and S i with
where t 1 and t 2 are chosen uniformly and independently at random from Z * m . We define V i = λT i m and
we conclude that
Therefore for some integer k we have
We denote by L the 5-dimensional lattice generated by the rows of the following 5 × 5 matrix:
Let us consider the vector u ∈ L defined as follows:
and another vector v = (0, 0, 0, 0,
From (6) we see that the distance between the vectors u and v is O(∆ 2 ). Taking into account that the determinant of the lattice L is ∆ 4 m, we see that any fivedimensional ball of radius ∆ 4/5 m 1/5−ε is very unlikely (heuristically) to contain more than one lattice vector. Thus, if ∆ = m 1/6−ε , then u is probably the only lattice vector within the distance O(∆ 2 ) out of v and thus will be recovered by the lattice reduction algorithm. Although this approach in the above form has led to a weaker bound on ∆ than that of Theorem 1, it can be generalised to, and used with, several values of t 1 , . . . , t d . Also notice that the method does not need any initial approximation to a and applies to arbitrary moduli m. It may be shown that heuristically this technique should work with ∆ = m 1/4−ε as d → ∞; however, it seems hard to turn this approach into a provable statement, as has been done in Theorem 1.
We also remark that Theorem 1 gives a certain result for the Weil pairing on elliptic curves. Namely, let s be a divisor of p − 1. Let E be a elliptic curve over the finite field F q of q elements, and let E tor [s] denote the s-torsion group of E, which consists of points P ∈ E (including points over the extensions of F p ) for which sP = O, the point at infinity. We recall that the Weil pairing of order s, for any points P, Q, R ∈ E tor [s], see [29] . Therefore, if s ≥ p 1/2+ε , then, given an oracle which for an unknown point U ∈ E tor [s] and a given point T ∈ E tor [s] outputs some approximation to e s (U, T ) (the required precision depends on the size of s, as in Theorem 1), one can compute e s (U, P ) for any P ∈ E tor [s] . Indeed, one can use this oracle to approximate e s (U, P + T ), e s (U, P ) and e s (U, T ) for polynomially many random points T ∈ E tor [s], getting the situation of Theorem 1.
Finally, Theorems 5 and 6 show that one cannot obtain an analogue of Theorem 1 with substantially larger values of ∆. For example, it cannot be obtained with ∆ = p exp(−(log p) 1/2+ε ) as it was for the original hidden number problem of [4, 5] . However, it would still be very interesting to try to improve Theorems 2 and 3, in order to reduce the gap between algorithmic results and impossibility results.
